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"Video" means "I See": Media and Anthropological
Instruction
Margaret Williamson Huber
University of Mary Washington

Traditional anthropological fieldwork depends in the first instance on
seeing. The accompanying text, so to speak, will not be available until
one has learned the language, and that can never replace observation
anyway. In this regard as in many others anthropology has much in
common with art. Like the beginning anthropologist, a drawing student
has to be taught how to see: in this case, how to translate the threedimensional world into two, the tactile into the purely visual. The student
learns to squint at the scene with one eye to produce a semblance of twodimensionality and to measure distances with a thumb held against a
pencil. But mostly she looks for shapes and patterns because what she
wants to record is not what her brain has identified for her—a flight of
steps, perhaps, breaking a stone retaining wall with ivy flowing over it and
a lamp post where the wall joins the balustrade of the stair—but geometric
forms that she represents as lines on the page in her sketchbook. But the
scene she tries to render is not simply shapes: it is an arrangement of
shapes that is more than the sum of its constituent parts. The appeal of the
scene lies in the relationships. It may be the contrast between the fractal
order of the ivy and the smooth wall; or the fact that the angle of incidence
of the wall to the balustrade is the inverse of that between the balustrade
and the lamp post. Whatever it may be, the artist has to be trained to look
at her environment in this way, to identify inherent harmonies, patterns,
resemblances and contrasts of shape and luminosity and texture, and to
relate every part of the scene to every other part of it.
Teaching our anthropology students to be anthropologists—not
just to know about anthropology but to be able to do it—means teaching
them to look at things in an analogous way. The papers in this series
discuss the use of digital media as a particular means to that end. Like an
artist, the anthropologist finds herself confronted by myriad visual
impressions, perhaps so many that the situation seems chaotic. But she
has been trained to understand that one person's chaos is other people's
order, an article of faith that prompts her to search for precisely what
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makes the situation make sense to the people who have created it. What
patterns are there? What resonances? What contrasts and discordances? In
these relationships she will find the intelligibility she looks for.
Doing ethnographic fieldwork is probably the toughest job on the
planet. No doubt many would argue with this—summer construction
workers in the Southwest, for example—but the fact is that the task is
supremely intellectually and physically challenging even when the
fieldwork site is part of one's own culture. In a comparatively brief time
the anthropologist must learn enough about "her" culture that she can
describe not only obvious things like the kinship system and how gardens
are made—the lines and shading of a drawing—but also the underlying
principles according to which all these things make a coherent
comprehensible whole—the relations among the components in the image.
She must also, in that time, recognize and attempt to suppress her own
cultural assumptions—perhaps including her own anthropological
training—which, however carefully she has been trained, still want to
obtrude themselves in her understanding of what she sees. But the focus
of research is always, as even Margaret Mead insisted, to understand
another people's way of life. This is a challenge even at home (for
example, the mystification at why anybody would vote for the other
candidate), so how much greater is the challenge when there are, we must
assume, completely different ways of thinking about everything—from
what to put in the cooking-pot to the right way to treat the spirits, and, not
least, seeing one as an analogue of the other.
Ethnography aims, first, to describe accurately and fully what we
have seen; and then to explain it. This means one must be able to see;
then, of course, to ask about what one sees. We know that what people
tell us, while essential, is never the whole story. Like all primates,
humans rely on vision more than any other sense; reciprocally, we
construct our environments mainly in terms of how they should look, and
our communications to appeal to the eye more than to any other organ.
After all, "see" is a synonym for "understand." When we say the
anthropologist has to be able to see, we mean understanding as well as an
informed gaze. We want our students to develop that capability.
Training students to do productive ethnography has been a
problem in anthropology for a long time. When I was an undergraduate,
in the sixties, there were no methods classes. The most we got was the
caution that you can't know before you get there what you will find or how
you ought to act. Things have changed by now, and for the better. For
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instance the program at my university is small enough that we can require
a minor ethnographic project—say, the study of a small locally-owned
retail establishment—in a number of courses; and one of the major
requirements is the successful completion of a "fieldwork-intensive"
course in addition to a course on the art of ethnography itself. Such
arrangements are hardly unique but, obviously, impractical for larger
institutions. And, as Cooper points out in her contribution in this issue,
even when class size is not an issue there may be concerns about safety,
legality, and ethics. One wonders, too, how long it will be before local
institutions and businesses politely request that we desist because they
cannot get their proper work done with all these students hanging about.
The essays in this collection demonstrate that visual media are a more than
acceptable substitute for introducing students to ethnographic practice,
either on their own or as a complement to face-to-face enquiry.
The papers explicate how each of the writers uses a variety of
visual media in the anthropology classroom and how well they work in
getting the students to see anthropologically. A lot of their message is
instruction for other teachers—mainly anthropologists, but not limited to
them. The writers are all clear that the use of images greatly enhances the
delivery of the material, and for a number of reasons. Nobody will find it
surprising to learn that students who spend much of their time looking at
media screens will be more at home with a video than with pages in a
book; nor that, given a supposed diminution in attention span (but see
Crary 1999:35-37) in the past few decades, short clips work better than
feature-length films or even 45-minute television segments. What is more
disturbing to any committed anthropologist is that many students evince a
complete lack of curiosity about, or empathy with, other people's ways of
life, so that the old standard ethnographic films fail to arouse much
besides derision in the audience, if they pay attention at all. These papers
suggest ways to counter this apathy and, at the same time, achieve an
essentially traditional training of anthropology students.
That is one level on which these papers address the use of media in
the classroom. They also consider how best to make students aware of the
pervasiveness of media objectively, as a cultural phenomenon—that is,
something contingent and not automatically part of life—and in the
process teach them how to regard media productions analytically. These
points are more explicit in the papers by Regonini and Thornburg but they
are at work in Cooper's as well. Altogether these papers make persuasive
cases for the use of such media as YouTube, popular television shows, and
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the students' own media productions in the college classroom. These are
not just how-to papers, reports of success or failure. This is not just about
experiments in a laboratory that happens to be an anthro classroom.
Implicitly or explicitly these papers also justify the introduction of popular
media into the august halls of academe.
It may seem odd that the use of media in this way requires defense.
Perhaps it doesn't. But I am struck by a recurring note in the literature (as
cited in, e.g., Goldfarb 2002: 1ff, 59; Cooper, this collection) to the effect
that while a good ethnographic film such as Gardner's Dead Birds is
suitable, even desirable, as a supplement to the written ethnography of the
Dani or of New Guinea peoples generally, using Star Trek or Lost is not.
Seeley (2008), in particular, describes the strong resistance of the academy
to the inclusion of popular materials in the syllabus. A usual objection is
that the latter are popular culture and as such have no place in an
anthropology classroom, where only intellectual entertainment is
appropriate. There is a persistent idea that visuals have a lower status than
the written word (Goldfarb 2002:3). This is an expression of the old
distinction between high and low culture, obviously. It may be fruitless to
insist that the distinction is invalid, since it is part of our culture and has
been for centuries; but I will try. It is worth noting, to begin with, that the
codification into "high" and "low" culture found its strongest expression
during that grand orgy of scientific classification, the nineteenth century
(e.g., Burke 1978:9ff), when it became imperative to impose an
hierarchical order on the seeming chaos of rapid industrialization and its
collateral effects. Thinking that popular culture is somehow less than
Culture is a Victorian mindset, which is to say, a cultural construction, and
thus no more axiomatic than any other cultural notion.
Denigration of popular culture arises in the first instance from its
negative definition: it is what is left over after you take the elite part out
(Burke 1978:24). Unlike the common notion of high culture, popular
culture is supposedly spontaneous and informal, highly variable,
transitory.
Of course as anthropologists we know that seeming
spontaneity and informality have their rules just as surely as does High
Mass in the Vatican. During a crazy time, nobody gets to act sane (cf.
Bateson 1958: 12-15; Leach 1961:135; Dumézil 1988:36-7). But to
anyone raised with dancing lessons and cookbooks—codified rules for
performance—the variations might well appear to be entirely ex tempore,
thus not to be taken seriously. How can something volatile and ephemeral
have any moral or intellectual value, especially when—as is often the
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case—it involves violence?
The idea of popular culture is an example of what Needham calls
polythetic classification, which results when several criteria, all of which
need not apply in any given case, define a category (Needham 1983:39,
43). Because it has multiple criteria differentially applied from instance to
instance, the term has no genuine analytic value. Correspondingly it
displays tremendous variation in the items that make up the category. It
retains earlier meanings of local and spontaneous (for example, garage
bands, rap artists, folklore, block parties). But it has also come to include
anything whose main purpose seems to be entertainment, that is,
amusement, especially for huge numbers of people at once—YouTube,
rock concerts, social networking. And it is characterized by novelty, so
that anything new will, presumably, knock out anything else as a focus of
attention. The idea that those productions deemed to be popular are not
intended to last, but to satisfy attention for the moment, influences our
ideas about the media as well. High culture is not only for the elite but for
the ages. Or so we like to think. It has something serious to say about the
human condition, or the cosmos, or some equally weighty matter that will
not disappear tomorrow. Popular culture appeals to the emotions, we say,
and supposedly requires only the minimum of human intelligence for its
appreciation; high culture appeals primarily to the intellect. And aren't
these just the qualities we want in the things we assign to our students?
Implicitly it's thought, too, that whereas appreciating high culture requires
a degree of connoisseurship—native good taste allied to high-level
instruction (Price 1989:7ff)—popular culture, because it is so unintellectual, neither has nor requires any such thing. Nor does it have a
body of scholarship attached to it, as do the works of elite artists.
Reflection shows that these arguments are nonsensical. High
culture certainly extols the connoisseur and favors scholarly commentary,
but then so does the popular kind. Its followers are just as aware of the
history of their media, as alert to the influences that circulate from one
mode to another, as judicious in their criticisms, as appreciative of the
aesthetics, as any Berenson or Janson. This, by the way, counters the
objection that popular media fail to stimulate the intelligence. That isn't
true, of course; but more important is the fact that our students are
anything but passive recipients of the media. They think about it, and with
it, a lot (cf. Bird and Godwin 2006:286-7; Goldfarb 2002:60-61). Our
aim, of course, is to urge their critical reception into a productive
anthropological mode. Nor can we characterize popular culture as
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spontaneous and informal and high culture as deliberate and academic.
Thornburg's description, in this collection, of how much instruction and
labor go into his students' digital stories makes the point clearly. Even the
lowest-budget film production requires an enormous amount of planning
and organization; the effort that goes into graphic novels equals anything
done in the realm of so-called fine art. Other examples are legion. At the
same time, "freshness"—the semblance of spontaneity—is highly valued
in "fine" art. And all these forms borrow from each other, as they always
did (Burke 1987:58-63). Novelty certainly exists in popular culture; but
we expect it among the producers of fine art too, complaining when they
seem not to "go anywhere" with their work or borrow too heavily from
some previous artist.
In short the distinction is so arbitrary as to be meaningless. So
Staniszewski asks, "Isn't it time to leave behind criteria that equate 'high'
with Art and 'low' with popular culture and commerce, considering the
dominance of the market regarding the value of Art and the impact and
eloquence of certain aspects of popular culture such as rap, World Beat,
and the flood of pop and ethnic rock music that speak a language for both
the masses and the margins?" (1995:285; cf. Crary 1999:9). A very good
question. It is not just that, as she says, modern sensibility is concerned
more with the means of "presenting, preserving, and publicizing modern
Art"—and with the art market—than it is with the virtue inherent in the
objects themselves (1995:260). What we vaguely think of as sites of high
art—the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Tate, the Vatican, the Louvre—
are mobbed with visitors on almost any day you care to choose. Maybe
these crowds belong to an elite, but the criteria for calling them that are
elastic. Crowds of that size speak to the popularity of what these venues
have on display.
Many of the things we call high culture started out as experiments
in the medium, and in fact they were the popular culture of their day. We
know this is true of most modern art, which was deliberately challenging
the high/low distinction (Staniszewski 1995:199ff); but it is equally true of
Shakespeare and his contemporaries.1 The same argument can be made
about any number of venerated artists in all the media. People attended to
these productions in the first place because they were relevant to the
1

See for example Don Marquis's poems "pete the parrot and shakespeare" and "archy confesses"
(Marquis 1935). Marquis 's work, incidentally, shows just how arbitrary the high/popular
distinction is.
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present moment. Only later did some of them assume the status of
"classics," with a quite different meaning than their original one.
From this point of view modern movies and TV shows are no
different than The Marriage of Figaro or Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. I
propose this despite the certain objection that there can't be any
comparison between Gilligan's Island—the quintessential mindless TV
show—and Richard Strauss's Iphegenia in Aulis—where someone else
winds up on an island. Nobody claims that all popular culture is
wonderful. But it is also the case that simply being old does not make a
thing venerable. (The collection at the Isabella Stuart Gardner Museum in
Boston bears me out on this.) The good/bad dichotomy is in no way
assimilable to the (dubious) high/low one. But whether the product is
good or bad, its creators are trying to say something about the present and,
with luck, make some money at the same time. Actually, from a
Darwinian point of view we must agree that if it makes money, it says
something about the present. Directly and indirectly films, like operas,
novels, and paintings, communicate a great deal about the milieu in which
they are created. They can't help it: art, which includes the media, is a
cultural product and a producer of culture.
But persuading our students to understand this is as difficult as
getting them to see the way in which abstract theory is relevant to the
seemingly random actions they observe. With training, we come to see—
understand—the cultural-ness of even everyday things like eating a Big
Mac, putting a sofa in the living room, or wearing a t-shirt and jeans. As
Thornburg says in his paper, one's clothing is as much "media" as is a
digital story. We become alert to more subtle things, too, such as the
unconscious rules according to which people in our society treat each
other, which become obvious only when some transgression occurs, or
when—as used to be the case before the invention of the smartphone—one
beguiled the wait in a restaurant by trying to figure out the relationships
amongst the people at neighboring tables. Doing fieldwork in a different
culture throws all these taken-for-granted kinds of demeanor into relief
and thus shows how contingent they are. But, as we have remarked
already, making that kind of opportunity available to the many
undergraduates we must train is difficult if not impossible. So the use of
films, whether feature films or television, gives us a chance to highlight
these otherwise invisible social facts as well as to demonstrate the
relevance of theoretical constructions for their understanding.
This is the way that I have used visual media in my anthropology
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classes, most notably one that relied entirely on the original Star Trek
(Huber 2010): to provide visual exemplars of kinds of action or ways of
thinking about culture that were intended to foster anthropological
understanding, not least the ability to see what was going on. Like the
writers of these present papers, I found that having a visual component to
complement readings and lectures or discussions arouses interest and
makes it memorable. Combining images and letters like this is nothing
new, of course. Texts such as the Iliad and the Popol Vuh were almost
certainly intended to be accompanied by ritual or dance showing the
action that the words describe. Likewise we know of no ritual that does
not have its necessary textual accompaniment, whether spoken (or sung)
or written. What makes meaning, and thus memory, is a combination of
the two. When we put them together in our classrooms we re-discover
something that our own subjects of study have known for generations.
Cooper makes this a main point of her paper, as she justifies using
episodes of Lost in her classes. The objection to the use of film in class
because it will "erode literacy" has already been mentioned. Here is
evidence to the contrary, that intelligent juxtaposition of visual and written
resources enhances the value of both. Both Cooper and Regonini,
following Bird and Godwin (2006), argue that if the instructor does her
part to provide a context for the visuals—ethnographies, lectures, beforeand-after discussions—the students get much more out of them and learn,
in fact, how to see things with the anthropologist's eye.
It still may be a question, though, whether Hollywood productions,
as distinct from explicitly ethnographic films, can really be used to train
anthropologists. Obviously, these are not ethnographic films, and they do
not pretend to be. Their intention is to tell stories. To that end they
include anything that will make that happen, and they exclude everything
else. As such they belong to the genre of mythology, which is to say, a
narrative representation of a cultural idea of how the world is constituted;
and, as such, they are enormously useful for training anthropologists, if
not in the way that seems most obvious. Here we are not looking for
easily identified things like how a police hierarchy works or how a mother
and daughter interact. Recall that the art student has to learn not just to
recognize shapes but also how they are related to each other. The
relationships make a drawing something much more than marks on a
surface. Stories about policemen on disciplinary leave who nevertheless
save the day or rebellious daughters who manage to teach their mothers a
few good lessons in life are banal, but the idea that true innovation belongs
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to the outsiders (among whom we include the young) is not only an
important idea in American culture but well-nigh universal (Dumézil
1988). Training in the art of identifying these repeating patterns is critical
to anthropological success.
Part of what the contributors to this series are doing is getting
students to dig beneath the surface and see how the implicit informs the
explicit. The courses discussed in the papers by Regonini and Thornburg
focus on this issue from the perspective of the consumer and of the
producer of media, respectively. These courses aim to cause the students
to recognize the presence and impact of media, of its design and style, in
their own lives. Regonini draws on her training and experience as a
graphic designer to help her students regard the barrage of media they
encounter all the time with a fresh and analytical eye. Thornburg, by
making his students each produce a short video about themselves,
encourages them to reflect not just on the omnipresence of media in the
modern world but on the nature of the self in modern America.
Like Cooper, too, they are pushing students to be deconstructively
critical. This includes treating the videos as visual images and not as
narratives or exposition of any sort. Students have to become aware that
any video, however "spontaneous" it may seem, represents a series of
choices, and then they have to figure out what motivated the choices. This
is much more obvious in commercial productions, naturally, where
appearances should resonate with the story being told. But that same
awareness has to apply to amateur images that show up on YouTube and
elsewhere.
What ideas about the subject are being—however
unconsciously—transmitted along with the image? Dissecting a video is
just the same as sorting out the composition of a drawing, with the added
fun that the video moves and is, therefore, more revealing. And having
identified these inherent characteristics of videos, the student comes to
understand the basic cultural feedback loop—that culture is a system of
information in which we generate and receive messages all the time,
modifying (and causing others to modify) what we send in response to
what we receive, or hope to receive.
From these papers we get a faithful image of instructors whose
priority is helping their students to understand how to be anthropologists.
If it means including a good deal of visual material, then it does. But they
also convey that they use these in part to persuade their students actually
to read ethnography. And here I have to agree with them even as I support
the idea that images should be an inherent part of instruction. Our point is
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that the two complement each other. Each offers information not
accessible in the other medium. More critical to this discussion as a
whole, though, is the undeniable fact that video flattens the narrative. One
has only to compare the film versions of—to take two egregious cases—
The Lord of the Rings or the Harry Potter books to the written versions to
see that this is so. A picture may be worth a thousand words, but it is
meaningless unless you know what those words are. What these papers
suggest is the extent to which that is true.
That this emerges as a suitable topic of discussion is hardly
surprising. The huge increase during the past couple of decades in the
media presence among us is something well worth any social analyst's
attention. Making students aware that this was not inevitable, but a
sociological phenomenon explicable in sociological terms—as these
authors are doing in these classes—is an important step in making students
aware that they are cultural beings. Although these papers focus on the
pedagogical uses of media for anthropology without being otherwise
analytical, they also raise a fundamental and important question, which the
authors and their students may think it worthwhile to pursue.
The media-saturated world that Ray Bradbury describes with
dismay in Fahrenheit 451 now seems not so impossibly fanciful. And it is
very easy to think of these developments as something that was inevitable,
as if once the possibility of transmitting moving images became available,
all else must follow. This is, though, a dangerous way for an
anthropologist to think. We must always ask (to paraphrase Leach
[1969:42]), "Why has this happened, and not something else"? We tend to
look at successful cultural forms the same way we think of successful
biological ones, that is, teleologically. People think that biological success
is somehow just going to happen, and they forget the many forms that
failed to prosper. Likewise, we think we have explained why a cultural
form is successful when we describe its attractions or its utility. It seems
to arise of necessity rather than contingently. But the fact is that lots of
things are attractive and useful but not all of them become pervasive;
moreover, our stance has to be that attraction and utility are culturally
determined, not inherent in the things themselves.2 Which brings us back
2

No doubt there will be howls of protest against this assertion. And to a certain extent they will be justified.
Many of our choices are quite obviously based on practical considerations. But, as Sahlins (1976:37, 55, 168,
passim) argues, those choices are necessary because we have already, collectively and without consideration for
practicality or for reason, chosen how we want to live. Given that decision, certain practical considerations
necessarily follow, but they do not in the first instance determine a way of life.
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to the question: why are these forms everywhere? I don't intend to do
more here than sketch the possibility of a line of enquiry suggested by
these papers.
Thornburg refers to Benedict Anderson's well-known Imagined
Communities as an important source for understanding the role of media in
modern life. Although there are reasons to resist parts of Anderson's
argument, it is, nevertheless, not inapposite for this discussion. Thornburg
talks about modern media as a "social glue" analogous to the
dissemination of printed materials and, eventually, newspapers that
Anderson cites as the principal way that nations, and the sense of
nationhood, got their start and maintained themselves. These are means
by which people who will never meet face-to-face, who will never be able
to know, and know immediately, that they share sentiments and
knowledge, can find justification in a sense of commonality: they belong
to an imagined community which is nonetheless real for being imagined.
So far this is appealing. He also makes the point that, before printing and
the wide dissemination of printed materials, "the figuring of imagined
reality was overwhelmingly visual and aural" (2006:23). Have we then
simply come full circle? Or at least gone through 360º in the temporal
helix? It may be so. Modern media stress globalism perhaps more than
nationalism; or, rather, they mention nations now as indices of
geographical distance rather than as politically significant entities in order
to enhance the sense that anywhere on the globe is immediately accessible
from anywhere else. The resulting society is no longer merely to be
imagined. The Internet is busy with images of people in every kind of
activity and crammed with signed reviews of every kind of thing. You
know what people look like and what their opinions are. Still, this does
not mean that you know them in the same way that you know your family
or your neighbors, with whose whole unstudied presence you are familiar
even if you are not always conscious of it. It is actually a community
different from that and also derived from Anderson's imagined
community. Its population is self-selected, and it selects also the
images—including spurious names and identities—that it wants the rest of
the world to see. What we have to imagine now is not that there are other
people out there, but what it is they don't want us to know about them.
This is a virtual community of imagined persons.
Saying so does not however answer the basic question of why
anybody would want this. Are we to assume that the human race always
has, but until now we couldn't do it? Is this a new iteration of the
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Renaissance idea that humanity should control nature? Is it a practical
realization, insofar as we are able, of magical devices children learn about
in bed-time stories? Or perhaps it's an attempt to overcome by its own
means the alienation created by capitalism.
Whatever the answer turns out to be, a necessary first step,
described by Cooper, Regonini, and Thornburg in these papers, is
understanding the thing you want to explain. To say that they are training
anthropologists does not need saying, except to set it up in opposition to
other explanatory possibilities, most obviously history and psychology.
How easy to answer this question "why?" by referring to Gates and Jobs,
and to earlier developers of media devices and content—even relating all
this ultimately to the development of machinery in the ancient world so as
to make it appear that a divinity was opening her own sanctuary doors.
But can history really explain anything? A well-crafted history can trace
the course of a development, but unless the writer is equally well-versed in
anthropological theories of culture change the history will not explain why
things developed the way they did instead of some other way. Or it will
explain the developments in terms of economics or psychology, forgetting
that these are cultural forms like anything else.
And that is the reason, too, that psychology will not give us a
satisfactory answer either. The temptation to use psychology to explain all
this is not just strong: to many, it seems to be the only rational choice. In
the well-known aphorism, anthropology deals with collectivities,
psychology with individuals. The phenomenon we are looking at seems to
be manifestly an individually-oriented one. We have only to point to the
plethora of individually-owned, individually-used devices intended to
record and transmit images either of individuals or of scenes that
individuals have decided ought to be shared with others. But we also take
for granted the idea that mass media should provide personal, individual
enjoyment. All of this argues that we are talking about a psychological
phenomenon, or "human nature." Most people have no trouble in
assuming the "naturalness" of wanting and of using these devices and of
responding to what they produce. But this, of course, is the pitfall of
doing anthropology in one's own culture. In seeming to be necessary
rather than contingent, and in being at some level intelligible even if it is
regrettable, it seems to proceed from one's own psyche instead of from the
fact that we live in a society and that we collectively generate these ideas
and these things.
This brings me back to my starting point, the development of the

“Video” Means “I See” 13
anthropologist's eye. As the eye is an extension of the brain, what we are
doing as we focus on seeing is trying to shape our students' way of
thinking so that they recognize, even in their own choices and judgments,
instantiations of cultural ideas. This, in turn, means that they will always
seek a sociological explanation for such phenomena, which after all is the
only valid way to understand them.
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